Club 提要：伊朗美国谈判前夕，巴基斯坦信德大学助理教授西拉杰·尼扎马尼（Siraj Nizamani）特为北京对话撰文指出，中国积极参与地区冲突协调与稳定塑造。他认为，与西方“（自身）安全优先”的干预模式截然不同，中国在参与全球秩序与冲突管理时更强调“发展为先”，通过长期投资、基础设施联通，共同发展为纽带，构建地区稳定。
（翻译｜杨敏 核译｜韩桦）
在一个日益互联的世界中，地区冲突正对全球贸易与经济稳定产生深远影响，尤其是中东地区围绕伊朗的紧张局势。霍尔木兹海峡等关键水道的海上安全风险，不仅危及石油运输，更对全球供应链体系构成大规模冲击。除了公开外交方式，主要经济大国往往会通过低调的间接渠道推动局势缓和、保护其战略利益。
中国的协调策略，根植于其更广泛的经济战略，特别是“一带一路”倡议。该倡议通过构建国家间的相互依存关系，结构性地降低了冲突发生的概率。这一逻辑体现了“商业和平”，即不断增强的贸易与投资联系，将显著提高发生冲突的机会成本。
这种将外交斡旋与经济战略相结合进行冲突管理的做法，也体现在中国对巴基斯坦停火倡议的支持中。通过谨慎支持巴方提议、推进“五点框架”并将自身定位为潜在保障方，中国力求在不承担明显主导角色的情况下影响谈判进程。
这一低调外交不仅体现中国的审慎姿态，更是中国经济战略的精准延伸。鉴于巴基斯坦同时与伊朗和美国保持沟通，中国凭借与巴基斯坦的密切伙伴关系，将其作为外交中介，更将其定位为“一带一路”倡议中的关键经济支点。通过中巴经济走廊，巴基斯坦以基础设施与贸易网络连接中国与中东地区，强化了跨区域一体化体系。这些投资形成了长期的投入与共同风险敞口，提高了地区动荡的经济成本，又促使各方利益逐渐趋同。因此，巴基斯坦既充当了地缘政治中介，也已成为经济桥梁，使中国得以巧妙塑造谈判环境。
3月31日，中共中央政治局委员、外交部长王毅在北京同巴基斯坦副总理兼外长达尔举行会谈。（图源：中国外交部）
中国的总体策略是在最大化经济收益与结构性影响力的同时，将风险降到最低。中国并不会依赖直接干预，而是优先维护有利于贸易流动、保护长期投资并确保基础设施高效运转的环境。这一点在中国推动沙特伊朗和解进程时尤为明显：中国支持对话，但不强加条件，同时保持与双方的经济联系。因此，“稳定”成为了经济发展的必需品，与持续的商业和投资安全息息相关。通过将潜在对立国纳入互联的贸易和投资网络，中国增加了经济相互依存，从而提高风险成本、促进合作意愿。这使中国能通过经济联系间接塑造结果，避免公开政治和军事介入的风险。
中东对中国具有重要战略意义。中东处在全球贸易航线的枢纽地位，通过投资和商业与中国有深度经济合作。作为主要的能源进口国，中国依赖该地区的石油供应，任何中断都将直接影响其经济情况。而中国是全球的制造业中心，即便是最微小的中断，也可能对全球供应链产生重要连锁影响。中国在“一带一路”框架下拓展替代路线和基础设施建设，试图以此减少对马六甲海峡等关键瓶颈的依赖。瓜达尔港和恰巴哈尔港等项目表明，中国不仅在保障供应线路安全，还关注分散风险、提升物流效率。这些投资既增强了供应链韧性，又将区域经济整合到互联互通的网络中。
巴基斯坦瓜达尔港。（图源：新华社）
对比西方传统的冲突解决方式，可以更清晰地理解中国在冲突管理中的角色定位。以美国模式为代表的西方策略历来强调“（自身）安全优先”的框架，包括军事联盟、威慑机制乃至直接干预。这些路径能在短期内强制实现稳定，但往往是在零和博弈的逻辑中运作的，即一方的安全收益即被视为另一方的损失，由此延续了潜在的紧张关系。
相比之下，中国推行的“（共同）发展为先”模式根植于经济一体化与长期投资。通过“一带一路”倡议，中国寻求力图将各国嵌入贸易、基础设施和金融网络之中，从而重塑国家间的结构性激励机制。从经济学视角看，这一路径既提高了冲突的机会成本，又通过合作创造共同收益。与强制性模式不同，中国策略依托市场化的相互依存关系，即共同的经济利益强化了稳定，冲突逐渐丧失其经济合理性。
总体而言，中国通过低调外交与经济互依相结合的方式，参与地区冲突管理。 中国借助巴基斯坦等合作伙伴、将各地区纳入“一带一路”框架，成功协调了对立国家的利益，使之趋向稳定合作。从经济上看，这一战略提高了冲突的机会成本，强化了供应链整合，并保障了长期投资安全。中东地区的战略重要性进一步展现了中国日益深入的参与方式。与滥用军事干预不同，中国强调互联互通、投资合作与相互依存，构建了一种独特的安全模式。在这种模式中，稳定不是强加的，而是由经济激励达成的。尽管挑战依然存在，但这种战略标志着全球秩序的重大转向——相互依存正日益成为冲突预防的首要基础，而非霸权主导。
以下为英文原文：
In an increasingly interconnected world, regional conflicts—particularly in the Middle East involving Iran and its tensions with regional actors—carry significant implications for global trade and economic stability. Maritime insecurity in critical waterways, such as the Strait of Hormuz, threatens not only oil shipments but the broader global supply chain. In such a context, major economic powers are compelled to intervene, not always through overt diplomacy but often via subtle, backdoor channels aimed at preserving stability while advancing strategic interests. For China, however, such engagement is deeply rooted in its broader economic strategy, particularly the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which seeks to create interdependence among states and thereby structurally reduce the likelihood of conflict. This reflects the logic of commercial peace theory, where increasing trade and investment linkages raise the opportunity cost of conflict.
China’s engagement with Pakistan’s ceasefire initiative illustrates the convergence of diplomacy and economic strategy in its approach to conflict management. By discreetly supporting Islamabad’s proposal, advancing a five-point framework, and positioning itself as a potential guarantor, China has sought to shape negotiations without assuming a visibly dominant role. This form of backdoor diplomacy reflects more than caution—it is a calculated extension of China’s economic statecraft. Leveraging its close partnership with Pakistan, China utilizes Pakistan not only as a diplomatic intermediary—given its ability to maintain working relations with both Iran and the United States—but also as a critical economic node within the Belt and Road Initiative. Through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Pakistan connects China to the Middle East via infrastructure and trade networks,reinforcing a system of cross-regional integration. These investments generate long-term sunk costs and shared financial exposure, increasing the economic cost of instability while aligning incentives toward cooperation. In this way, Pakistan functions as both a geopolitical intermediary and an economic bridge through which China subtly shapes the conditions for negotiation.
China’s broader approach seeks to minimize political risk while maximizing economic returns and structural influence. Rather than relying on direct intervention, Beijing prioritizes conditions that sustain trade flows, protect long-term investments, and ensure efficient use of infrastructure. This is evident in its facilitative role in the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, where it supported dialogue without imposing outcomes, preserving economic ties with both sides. Stability, therefore, functions as an economic necessity tied to uninterrupted commerce and investment security. By embedding rival states within interconnected trade and investment networks, China increases mutual economic exposure, raising the cost of conflict and incentivizing cooperation. This enables Beijing to shape outcomes indirectly through economic linkages while avoiding the risks of overt political or military involvement.
The Middle East holds significant strategic importance for China due to its centrality in global trade routes and its deep economic integration through investment and commerce. As a major importer of energy, China relies heavily on oil supplies from the region, making any disruption a direct threat to its economic stability. Given its position as a global manufacturing hub, even minor interruptions can have cascading effects on global supply chains. In response, China has sought to reduce its dependence on vulnerable chokepoints like Malacca Strait by expanding alternative routes and infrastructure under the BRI framework. Projects such as Gwadar Port and chabahar port illustrate how China is not only securing supply lines but also diversifying risk and improving logistical efficiency. These investments enhance supply chain resilience while integrating regional economies into interconnected networks, thereby increasing the economic cost of instability.
A clearer understanding of China’s role in conflict management emerges when contrasted with traditional Western approaches to conflict resolution. Western strategies, particularly those associated with the United States, have historically emphasized security-first frameworks, including military alliances, deterrence, and, at times, direct intervention. While such approaches can enforce short-term stability, they often operate within a zero-sum logic, where gains in security for one actor may be perceived as losses for another, thereby sustaining underlying tensions. In contrast, China advances a development-first model rooted in economic integration and long-term investment. Through BRI, Beijing seeks to reshape the structural incentives of states by embedding them within networks of trade, infrastructure, and finance. From an economic perspective, this approach increases the opportunity cost of conflict while generating mutual gains through cooperation. Unlike coercive models, China’s strategy relies on market-based interdependence, where stability is reinforced by shared economic stakes, gradually rendering conflict economically inefficient.
In conclusion, China’s engagement in regional conflicts through indirect and backdoor diplomacy reflects a calculated strategy grounded in economic interdependence. By leveraging partners such as Pakistan and embedding regions within the BRI framework, China aligns the interests of rival states toward stability. Economically, this approach increases the opportunity cost of conflict, strengthens supply chain integration, and promotes long-term investment security. The strategic importance of the Middle East further explains Beijing’s growing involvement. Rather than relying on military intervention, China’s emphasis on connectivity, investment, and interdependence represents a distinct model of peace—one in which stability is not enforced but economically incentivized. While challenges remain, this approach signals a broader shift toward a global order in which interdependence, rather than dominance, becomes the primary foundation of conflict prevention.